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Deforestation in Indonesia
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Abstract
This paper shows that the level of deforestation in Indonesia is positively related
to the degree of ethnic fractionalization. To identify a causal relation we exploit the
exogenous timing of variation in the level of ethnic heterogeneity due to the creation of
new jurisdictions. We provide evidence consistent with a lower control of politicians,
through electoral punishment, in more ethnically fragmented districts. Our results
are consistent with the literature on (under) provision of public goods in ethnically
diverse societies.
Keywords: Deforestation, Ethnic Diversity, Corruption, Indonesia
JEL: D73, L73, 010
INTRODUCTION
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change attributes up to one-third of total an-
thropogenic carbon dioxide emissions to deforestation, mainly in tropical areas. Much of
the latter can be attributed to illegal logging which is driven by the collusion of corrupt
politicians and logging companies. In Indonesia corruption is endemic, much of logging
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is illegal and local politicians receive bribes in exchange of licenses to log (Burgess et al.,
2012). Corruption leads to over exploitation of forests.
This paper investigates how the characteristics of local populations matter for illegal
logging in Indonesia, which is an extremely ethnically fractionalized country. Forests are
public goods. Local populations dislike corruption of their representatives. However, ethnic
diversity reduces the ability of locals to coordinate to better control politicians and punish
them when appropriate. In fact, ethnic fractionalization has a detrimental effect on social
capital, trust, and participation in communal activities (Nannicini et al., 2013).1 Control
of politicians is another public good undersupplied in diverse societies. As a result, ethnic
fragmentation increases deforestation.
Following the decentralization process started in 1998, Indonesian forests became con-
trolled by district-level elected governments, in charge of allocating and enforcing logging
licenses. The decentralization was accompanied by an increase in the number of adminis-
trative jurisdictions through the proliferation of district splits which allowed the creation of
more homogeneous communities. Most of the newly-formed districts were more ethnically
homogeneous; in fact, increasing homogeneity was one of the motivations of splitting.2 We
construct a time-varying measure of ethnic fractionalization during the period 2000-2012.
We argue, and try to provide evidence for, that the timing of the splitting was exogenous
to local conditions. The central government intervened at two points in time halting the
redistricting process unexpectedly and introducing idiosyncratic variation across districts.
In this paper we set up a very simple illustrative model to provide the intuition behind
the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and illegal logging. Then we test the predic-
tions of the model using a rich dataset on Indonesia districts. First, a simple cross sectional
analysis supports our main hypothesis that ethnic fractionalized areas display more defor-
estation. We then construct a time-varying measure of ethnic fractionalization by consid-
ering the changes in administrative borders over the period 2000-2012. By exploiting the
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(most likely) exogenous timing of the creation of new jurisdictions, the evidence on panel
data supports a causal relationship between ethnic diversity and deforestation. Finally, we
provide an empirical test of the impact of ethnic fragmentation on the control of politicians
and ultimately on deforestation. We highlight a sort of political deforestation cycle (PDF).
In pre-electoral years politicians allow more deforestation and they are rewarded for that.
However, this occurs only in ethnically fragmented districts where, as we assume, control
of districts heads is lower. This finding is reminiscent of recent results on political budget
cycles occurring mostly where the freedom of the press and control of politicians are lower
especially in new democracies in central and eastern Europe (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya,
2004).
This paper contributes to the body of works on the effect of ethnic fractionalization on
public goods provision (Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Miguel and
Gugerty (2005)). In Indonesia, Bandiera and Levy (2011), find that in villages with higher
ethnic diversity, the level of public goods provision reflects the preferences of the wealthy
elite when a democratic system is in place. Our paper is also related to the literature on
the depletion of common resources such as water, fisheries and air (Lloyd (1833), Hardin
(2009), Ostrom (1990)). In the absence of regulation or well defined property rights, the
“tragedy of the commons” is pervasive. Related to this, our paper is linked to the litera-
ture on natural resource management, specifically deforestation, in developing countries.
One of the first studies to use forest cover data is by Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) who
show that income and population growth are the leading causes of forest growth in India.
Another relevant branch of this literature has looked at the effect of decentralization of
forest management. Baland et al. (2010), find that transferring forest management to local
communities can reduce tree lopping by 20 percentage points. Baland et al. (2010) find
a decrease in firewood and fodder collection activities. Our results also relate to those
in Burgess et al. (2012) who show that greater political fragmentation is detrimental to
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deforestation due to increased competition among districts for the provincial wood market.
Our findings suggest, however, an additional and different effect of political fragmentation.
In an ethnically heterogeneous environment, an increase in political jurisdictions can have
beneficial effects on deforestation if it leads to lower ethnic fragmentation. We compare in
great detail our results to theirs in Section VI.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the institutional
background in Indonesia with a particular emphasis on the process of political fragmen-
tation. In Section II, we present a simple theoretical framework that highlights one of
the possible link between ethnic heterogeneity and deforestation. Section III describes the
data while Section IV discusses the empirical methodology. The main results and rela-
tive robustness checks are in Section V. In Section VI we relate our results to the ones in
Burgess et al. (2012) and Section VII provides evidence on the relationship between ethnic
diversity, control of politicians and deforestation. The last section concludes.
I INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
I.I POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION
Indonesia is very ethnically diverse with more than 500 ethnic groups and 742 languages
and dialects. The majority of these groups are native to the country. Indonesia is divided
into provinces, subdivided into districts (Kabupaten), the administrative units considered
in our analysis. Districts are further subdivided into subdistricts (Kecamantan), and finally
into villages (Desa). Ethnic and religious cleavages are a salient characteristic of Indonesian
population since precolonial times. When the Dutch established their colonial rule they
exploited the ethnic divisions to extend their political control over the country, a strategy
which exacerbated ethnic cleavages. During the authoritarian regime of Sukarno (1945-
1965) acts of violence perpetrated by the military and the police tapped into local ethno-
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religious relations. Claims for ethnic identities were suppressed. The same applies to
the Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998). After his fall in 1998, the democratic government
embraced multiculturalism with an uprise of identity politics and separatist movements
(Ostwald et al., 2016).
A vast decentralization process, transferred power from the central government to the
districts, with two laws of 1999 (Law 22 and Law 25). Only national defence, monetary
and foreign policy remained under the central government authority. After the beginning
of 2001, when decentralization laws were implemented, the country experienced a rapid
growth in the number of newly created political jurisdictions. Between 2000 and 2010,
the number of provinces increased from 27 to 34 and the number of districts from 341 to
497. Geographic dispersion, political and ethnic differences, natural resource wealth and
bureaucratic rent seeking (Fitrani et al., 2005) were the key forces which influenced this
process. Most importantly, administrative units would split because of a desire by some
ethnic groups to establish their own district where they would become the majority ethnic
group. According to the regulation on redistricting, if a district wanted to split, the parties
putting forward the request should provide detailed evidence supporting the viability of
the new unit. In particular the new district should demonstrate to satisfy 19 criteria,
showing a sufficient level of institutional capacity and a minimum scale requirement. The
proposals were submitted to the Regional Autonomy Advisory Council or DPOD (Dewan
Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah). The latter was responsible for reviewing proposals and
draft a legislation for the national parliamentary approval. Finally, the request of creating
a new district had to be approved by the district parliament, by the head of the original
district as well as by the Indonesian parliament, the Interior Ministry and the relevant
provincial government.
Our identification strategy relies on the plausible exogeneity of the time of splitting,
which we discuss in great detail in Section IV.III. First in 2004, shortly after his election and
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later in 2009, President Yudhoyono halted the splitting process. In both cases the decision
was unexpected and it was not clear how long it would last. The rationale behind the
moratoria was that many of the new districts were draining fiscal resources from the central
government, the reason being that many of the new districts created were not economically
viable (Jeffreys et al., 2009). In 2004, to counteract this trend, the introduction of the law
32/2004 made the requirements to be met by new districts more stringent, increasing the
minimum number of sub-districts from three to five and requiring the original district
to be at least seven years old (Nordholt and van Klinken, 2007). Given the uncertainty
about the duration of the ban, proposals for new districts continued to be submitted to
the DPOD during the first moratorium.4 The moratoria delayed the approval of new
districts at various stages of the bureaucratic procedure and resulted in these districts
being created at around the same time of other districts that initiated the formal process
years later. In addition the muddled and cumbersome approval procedure was subject
to various bureaucratic delays. Overall both the moratoria and these delays introduced
idiosyncratic variation in the date of approval of new districts. Section IV.III provides
detailed empirical evidence supporting the validity of our identifying assumption namely
that the timing of the splits was exogenous to local conditions.
The decentralization process allocated a significant portion of timber revenues to local
jurisdictions (Arnold, 2008) and empowered local public officials to issue logging permits
beyond national control opening new opportunities for corruption and rent seeking (Mar-
tini, 2012).5 Thus logging activities increased significantly, partly because deforestation
that was considered “illegal” by the central government was made “legal” by several locali-
ties (Casson and Obidzinski, 2002). In reality, there is a large grey area between “legal” and
“illegal” permits. District governments frequently issued permits which overlap with those
issued by neighboring governments, exceeded caps imposed by the central government and
allowed logging in customary forests that were reserved for use by indigenous people.6
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Throughout the decentralization process, forest-dependent communities were empow-
ered to exert property rights over customary forest. Heads of districts (Bupatis) were
permitted to issue small-scale forest conversion licenses conditionally to a pre-negotiated
agreement between a company and the community. Although a restructuring of the licens-
ing system in 2003 resulted in small-scale licenses being banned by the central government,
many district officials continued issuing them contributing to increase the overall amount
of “legal” logging. In addition, heads of districts continued to be entitled to issue large
logging concessions within their borders (Barr et al., 2006). Since 2003, forestry related
revenues are shared between districts and national governments.
II A SIMPLE MODEL
Our simple model shares some features with Burgess et al. (2012) but we focus on ethnic
heterogeneity. We assume a large number of logging firms which seek to obtain a permit
in a district. The head of the district decides the number of permits to sell to firms taking
the price of wood as given. Bribes are needed to obtain any permit which goes beyond the
legal quota. Ethnic diversity decreases the control of politicians, through electoral or legal
punishment.
The logging company solves the following problem:
Max
f
π(f) ≡ f(p− c− b) (1)
s.t. π(f) = 0 (2)
where f is the amount of wood extracted by the company, p is the price that is determined
at the province level, exogenous, c is the marginal cost of extraction and b is the bribe per
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unit of wood to be paid to the head of district. Given free entry, the company maximizes
its profit under the zero profit condition. The maximum bribe the company is willing to
pay is:
π(f) = 0 → b∗ = (p− c) (3)
The local politician decides how many permits to allocate and faces the risk of be-
ing punished. The probability of punishment, φ(f − f̄ , EF ), is a convex function of
the difference between the number of illegal permits issued and the legal quota, f̄ , set
for the district and a decreasing function of the level of ethnic fractionalization EF , i.e.




V ≡ f(p− c)− φ(f − f̄ , EF )r (4)
Hence the first order condition is:
p− c = φf (f − f̄ , EF )r (5)
In equilibrium the politician issues an amount of logging permits such that the net
marginal benefit of issuing an additional permit is equal to the marginal cost. The effect
of an increase in ethnic diversity on the equilibrium number of permits is:
fEF (EF ) = −
φf,EF (f − f̄ , EF )
φff (f − f̄ , EF )
(6)
Recalling that φ is convex in f and decreasing in EF , we have that: fEF (EF ) > 0.
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II.I SUMMING UP
The empirical implication of our model is that deforestation is higher in more ethnically
diverse districts. The mechanism behind this result is highlighted in equation (6): more
ethnically diverse districts, being less able to punish the politician’s misbehavior, render
bribing less costly for the politician. As a consequence, the latter releases a larger number
of illegal logging permits. The empirical analysis that follows in Section V will test the
main prediction of the model on the relationship between ethnic diversity and deforestation,
exploiting an exogenous variation in the level of ethnic diversity. In Section VII we will
provide some evidence supporting the specific channel described in the model, showing
that in more ethnically heterogenous districts politicians are more likely to be re-elected
in case of misbehavior. We will also compare the empirical implications of our model and
our results with those of Burgess et al. (2012).7
III DATA
We measure deforestation at the district level over the period 2000-2012 using satellite
forest cover data as provided by Hansen et al. (2013). The data are originally constructed
from Landsat images at 30-meter spatial resolution. Forest cover loss is recorded as a
binary variable and each pixel is assigned value 1, i.e. deforested, if it experienced a stand-
replacement disturbance or the complete removal of tree canopy cover over the year. The
data are measured in square meters for both forest cover in 2000 and annual deforesta-
tion over the period 2000-2012. A detailed description of our measure of deforestation is
provided in Appendix B. The forest area can be divided into four categories: production,
conversion, protection and conservation zones that spread across all districts. Production
and conversion zones are those in which legal logging is allowed and negotiations take place
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between logging companies and community representatives (Barr et al., 2006). While pro-
duction zones are devoted to the extraction of timber subject to the granting of a logging
permit, in conversion zones authorized companies can clear the forest to set up plantations
for oil palms and other estate crops. In protection and conservation zones, instead, logging
is prohibited.
Table 1 shows the amount of deforestation, in thousands hectares, occurred during the
period 2000-2012 in each province. About 12% of the initial forest area was deforested over
the period. Most of it occurred in the island of Kalimantan and several provinces of Suma-
tra. We measure ethnic fractionalization at the district level using the 2010 Indonesian
Census provided by the Indonesian National institute of statistics (BPS) and construct the




where s is the share of ethnic group j over the total population of the district i.8
Our unit of analysis is a district as defined by the original administrative borders in
2000 (pre-splitting). The cross section analysis compares deforestation and EF across 328
districts for which data are available.9 Average levels of ethnic fractionalization by province
are shown in Table 1 while overall average diversity is shown in Table 2, first row. There
is no discernible pattern of ethnic fractionalization across islands but there is significant
heterogeneity across districts as shown in the map in Figure C.1 of the Appendix .
The longitudinal analysis is based on 337 districts, as defined by the original admin-
istrative borders in 2000 (pre-splitting), and uses a time-varying measure of ethnic frag-
mentation.10 75 districts experienced one splitting event while 20 districts experienced two
splitting events over the period 2000-2012. The last split in our sample occurred in 2009.
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Table 1: Deforestation and Ethnic fractionalization by province
Province Area Forest Area Logging (2000-2012) EF (mean) EF (sd)
Sumatra
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 5,737 4,556 379 0.37 0.27
Sumatera Utara 7,161 5,088 884 0.56 0.25
Sumatera Barat 3,931 3,217 311 0.18 0.15
Riau 9,865 7,626 2,943 0.76 0.08
Jambi 4,929 3,958 1,031 0.65 0.13
Sumatera Selatan 8,761 5,856 1,738 0.81 0.05
Bengkulu 2,000 1,617 224 0.77 0.10
Lampung 3,392 1,486 179 0.56 0.17
Bangka Belitung 1,689 1,114 305 0.53 0.10
Java
DKI Jakarta 66 2 0 0.76 0.03
Jawa Barat 3,752 1,608 45 0.28 0.24
Jawa Tengah 3,490 1,191 29 0.04 0.06
DI. Yogyakarta 323 99 1 0.07 0.07
Jawa Timur 4,707 1,466 55 0.10 0.13
Banten 947 480 19 0.50 0.23
Nusa Tenggara
Bali 569 312 4 0.20 0.18
Nusa Tenggara Barat 2,002 1,013 30 0.33 0.26
Nusa Tenggara Timur 4,737 1,913 61 0.49 0.27
Kalimantan
Kalimantan Barat 14,794 12,272 1,957 0.79 0.19
Kalimantan Tengah 15,483 12,965 2,070 0.77 0.06
Kalimantan Selatan 3,768 2,383 444 0.35 0.22
Kalimantan Timur 19,477 16,939 1,778 0.82 0.06
Sulawesi
Sulawesi Utara 1,461 1,191 50 0.67 0.14
Sulawesi Tengah 6,159 5,222 338 0.73 0.20
Sulawesi Selatan 6,245 4,000 286 0.32 0.29
Sulawesi Tenggara 3,698 2,894 254 0.65 0.14
Gorontalo 995 808 47 0.22 0.06
Maluku
Maluku 4,684 3,881 96 0.80 0.10
Maluku Utara 3,173 2,920 120 0.87 0.05
Papua
Papua Barat 8,491 7,746 95 0.93 0.01
Papua 23,643 19,900 190 0.71 0.24
Total deforestation, area and forest cover are in thousand hectares from a cross-section of 328
districts based on 2000 administrative borders.
We consider the de jure time of splitting, which is the date in which the formal law to
create the new district is passed. Because our unit of observation is the district according
to pre-splitting boundaries, we do not distinguish between parent district that retains the
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and Sources
Variable Mean SD Min Max Source
Cross section Data (328 districts based on 2000 borders)
Ethnic fragmentation (EF) 0.43 0.32 0.01 0.94 Census 2000
Population (thousands) 671.38 655.38 24.01 6114.62 INDO-DAPOER
Population growth 12.26 24.81 -55.43 112.98 INDO-DAPOER
Share of Javanese people 0.32 0.36 0.00 1.00 Census 2000
New districts (province) 1.45 0.89 1.00 8.00 BPS Dristrict crosswalk table
Employment shares in:
Agriculture 58.38 22.19 8.24 95.96 Census 2000
Plantations 5.37 8.54 0.04 80.74 Census 2000
Forestry 16.50 21.88 0.04 95.12 Census 2000
Animal activities 7.78 5.82 0.21 60.11 Census 2000
Elevation (meters, mean) 330.27 316.29 5.61 2050.29 DIVA GIS
Elevation (meters, sd) 261.46 202.02 1.20 1277.61 DIVA GIS
Distance to sea (kilometers) 0.33 0.33 0.00 2.07 DIVA GIS
Number of rivers 2.20 7.09 0.00 89.00 DIVA GIS
Number of forest fires (province) 1242.72 1365.97 0.00 5625.00 Forestry Statistics 2011
Panel data (337 districts)
Expenditure (Million IDR) 659,245 562,800 4,777 5,212,000 INDO-DAPOER
District-level GDP (Million IDR) 5,386,153 10,413,760 107, 106 117,434,140 INDO-DAPOER
Infrastructure expenditure (Million IDR) 105,067 138,102 391 3,150,000 INDO-DAPOER
Population (thousands) 657 638 24 5,470 INDO-DAPOER
The number of new districts indicates the number of new districts formed from the initial district based on 2000 administrative
borders. Employment shares represent the share of the district population involved in the following activities: agriculture,
forestry, animal activities and plantations such as palm, tea, tobacco, rubber, etc. All data used for the cross-section analysis
refer to 2000 with the exception of population growth, number of districts, forest fires and conflicts and violence that refer to
the entire period 2000-2012.
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original capital, and child district that establishes a new capital.11 We return on this point
in Section IV.II.
Figure 1: Construction of the time-variant EF measure
This is based on the district Ogan Komering Ulu that split in 2003 to form the following three districts:
Ogan Komering Ulu, Ogan Komering Ulu Timur and Ogan Komering Ulu Selatan.
Figures 1 illustrates the construction of our time-varying measure of EF. The 2010
census allows us to construct actual measures of EF for all districts in 2010. The data
on ethnic fractionalization before splitting come from the 2000 population census and are
available at the district level. Therefore, we cannot compute the change in ethnic frac-
tionalization over time at a smaller scale than the pre-splitting borders, without imposing
very strong assumptions. In the example we consider three districts (A, B and C), cre-
ated after a splitting in 2003, with respective level of EF indicated by EFA, EFB and
EFC . For those districts that experienced one or more splitting since 2000, it is possible
to re-construct pre-splitting population by aggregating the population within pre-splitting
administrative borders. We compute the index of fractionalization of the original district,
after splitting, as a weighted average of the indexes of fractionalization of all districts lying
within pre-splitting district borders. This allows us to compute pre-splitting EF measures
based on the aggregated distribution of population across ethnic groups (EF for 2000 and
2002 in Figure 1). Because the unit of analysis is a district as defined by 2000 administra-
tive borders, in case of splitting, aggregate EF is measured by the weighted average of the
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EF levels of the newly formed districts, where weights (w) correspond to the respective
population shares.
Our measure implicitly assumes that changes in EF are only due to splitting. While mi-
gration from and to areas outside the 2000 administrative district borders and demographic
changes are also likely to affect the level of heterogeneity of the population, the lack of data
prevent us from constructing a more precise measure. We use the 2010 population cen-
sus for the backward construction of our time-variant measure of ethnic fractionalization
so that changes in administrative borders are the only drivers of the variations in ethnic
fractionalization over time.12 An index of EF constructed using the 2000 census shows a
correlation coefficient of 99% with our “constructed” measure for 2000, which confirms the
overall consistency of our measure with cross-districts differences in ethnic fractionaliza-
tion in 2000. The two indices are not directly comparable, i.e. we cannot substitute our
“constructed” EF in 2000 with actual EF from the 2000 census. This is because the two
census differ in terms of representativeness and coverage.13
Data on elections are from Burgess et al. (2011), originally obtained from the Centre
for Electoral Reform (CETRO). They include information on the year and results of the
district head elections and the incumbent status of the candidates. We also use several
control variables (descriptive statistics and relative sources are reported in Table 2). A
set of variables capturing geographic and ecological characteristics were obtained using
geo-referenced data on elevation (mean and standard deviation), distance from the sea
and the number of rivers in the district. The estimated extent of forest fires by province
was taken from the 2011 Forestry Statistics of Indonesia for the period 2007-2011. For the
panel analysis we also include measures of district-level GDP14, population and government




Figure 2 shows a positive correlation between deforestation and ethnic fractionalization.
Figure 2: Correlation between deforestation and ethnic diversity
Each circle represents a district based on 2000 borders. The dashed line indicates the linear fit. The graph
omits districts in the Island of Java.
Table 3 confirms this correlation with a set of regressions which control for several
additional variables. The dependent variable is total deforestation over the period 2000-
2012. The coefficient of pre-splitting ethnic fractionalization, in the last column, suggests
that a one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization (0.3) is associated with a
16% increase in deforestation. We begin by controlling for overall size of the district both in
terms of population and area of forest cover, both measured in 2000, and by including one
of the major drivers of deforestation, population growth over the period 2000-2012, that is
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also possibly correlated with ethnic diversity. We are also concerned with another particular
population phenomenon that is the migration resulted from the Transmigrasi program15
that could have influenced both ethnic diversity, as it involved the relocation of people
mainly of Javanese origin, and deforestation through land clearing for agriculture and
infrastructure. The share of Javanese people is aimed at controlling for the presence of this
particular ethnic group in a district. We also include the number of new districts created
within 2000 district borders as a way to account for the possible correlation between the
creation of new jurisdictions and ethnic diversity as a potential driver of district splitting
and, consequently of deforestation as documented in Burgess et al. (2012). We then include
measures of the importance of different land-related activities since ethnic fractionalization
could potentially be associated to the presence of ethnic groups with particular preferences
over certain forest-related activities. These are also measured at the beginning of the
period. The coefficient gains size and significance when controlling for these variables.
We then include a set of geographic and ecological endowments using geo-referenced data
on elevation (mean and standard deviation), distance from the sea and the number of
rivers in the district. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 3 deal with the potential role of ethnic
fractionalization as a possible cause of forest fires and conflicts. The relationship between
ethnic fractionalization and deforestation remains positive and statistically significant at
the 5% in line with the main prediction of the model.
IV.II DISTRICT SPLITS, ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION AND
DEFORESTATION
In this section we provide a more rigorous test for the main prediction of our simple
theoretical framework. In particular, we regress the log of deforestation (f) on the time-
varying level of ethnic diversity (EF ) while controlling for district-level fixed-effects, ui:
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Table 3: Correlation between ethnic fractionalization and deforestation
Dep. var.: deforestation 2000-2012 (log) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EF 0.381 0.386 0.508** 0.540** 0.380* 0.434** 0.447** 0.503**
(0.259) (0.241) (0.231) (0.238) (0.214) (0.197) (0.200) (0.210)
Population growth 0.007** 0.007** 0.004 0.006* 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population (log) 0.268*** 0.273*** 0.308*** 0.360*** 0.331*** 0.345*** 0.349*** 0.269***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.076) (0.080) (0.077) (0.072) (0.075) (0.083)
Forest Area (log) 1.097*** 1.096*** 1.111*** 1.050*** 1.090*** 1.081*** 1.079*** 1.073***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.040)
Share of javanese 0.369** 0.324* 0.304* 0.089 0.146 0.142 0.252
(0.168) (0.171) (0.179) (0.215) (0.201) (0.202) (0.364)
Number of new districts in province -0.202*** -0.167** -0.113* -0.117* -0.119* -0.067
(0.073) (0.065) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.054)
Share agriculture -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Share estate 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Share forest -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Share animal -0.002 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.024***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
Elevation (mean) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elevation (sd) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to the sea 0.284* 0.284* 0.279* 0.270**
(0.161) (0.151) (0.149) (0.119)
Number of rivers -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)




Number of districts 328 328 328 328 328 328 328 227
Standard errors are clustered at the province level (in parentheses), *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Each observation is a district
based on 2000 district boundaries. All specifications include island fixed-effects. The dependent variable is the log of square meters
deforested over the period 2000-2012. The last column excludes the island of Java. All variables refer to 2000 with the exception of
population growth, number of districts, forest fires and conflicts and violence that refer to the entire period 2000-2012. Employment
shares represent the share of the district population employed in the following activities: agriculture, forestry, animal activities and
plantations such as palm, tea, tobacco, rubber, etc.
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fipt = βEFipt + γXipt + δysplitipt + dt + ui + dt × vp + εipt, (8)
where the coefficient β identifies the effect of a change in the index of ethnic fractional-
ization, EF , on the level of deforestation. District fixed effects control for time invariant,
district-specific characteristics. We also include a dummy for the year of splitting, ysplitipt.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level. Since EF changes only after the
splitting and the time of splitting varies across districts, our exercise can be viewed as a
generalization of a diff-in-diff estimation with more than two groups and more than two pe-
riods, where the change in EF corresponds to the intensity of treatment. This estimation
procedure eliminates any potential heterogenous effect across post-splitting administrative
units. For instance, after splitting ethnic fractionalization might decrease (relative to the
pre-splitting index of EF of the district they originated from) less in parent districts than in
child districts, and so could deforestation or vice-versa. The estimated β could mask such
dynamics. However, this is not a major concern for two main reasons: first, we are inter-
ested in average changes in deforestation and ethnic diversity within pre-splitting borders.
Second, ethnic fractionalization generally decreased in most post-splitting administrative
units compare to their pre-splitting counterparts. In fact, one driver of district splitting
was the level of ethnic fractionalization, with new districts being created with the purpose
of having a more ethnically homogenous population. Table 4 confirms this pattern showing
that ethnically heterogeneous districts were more likely to split and that the average level
of EF decreased within all districts that experienced a splitting. This trend implies that
at least the most populated areas had a decrease in ethnic fractionalization after splitting.
Finally, because it is reasonable to expect a lagged effect of a change in ethnic diversity on
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of time-varying ethnic fractionalization
Average EF Change in EF Change in EF Districts
(weighted average) (simple average)
Districts that split 0.58 -0.046 -0.051 95
By quintile:
1 -0.002 0.009 19
2 -0.051 -0.054 19
3 -0.063 -0.075 19
4 -0.054 -0.064 19
5 -0.058 -0.071 19
Districts that did not split 0.35 242
All districts 0.42 337
The table reports sample averages. Differences between the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles
are not statistically significant but they are statistically different from the first quintile (for
both measures).




βjEFipt−j + γXipt + δysplitipt + dt + ui + dt × vp + εipt, (9)
where
∑
j βjEFipt−j is the sum over the number of lags of ethnic diversity included in
the model. We consider both one and two lags.
IV.III IDENTIFICATION
We now discuss the exogeneity assumption of the timing of splitting.16 First, we regress
the number of years before splitting since 2000, on a set of initial district characteristics,
each at a time. Results are reported in Table 5. We considered both the entire sample
(column 1), and two separate samples; one including districts that split before 2005 (column
2) and the second, including districts that split after 2005 (column 3). We also use an
indicator variable for whether the splitting took place after the first moratorium, which
occurred between 2004 and 2006 (column 4). The evidence in Table 5 confirms that the
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timing of creation of new districts was uncorrelated to a number of relevant district initial
characteristics such as ethnic fractionalization17, pre-splitting deforestation, population
and district size. The only significant coefficient is the one of district-level GDP for the
pre-2005 period. This is not surprising since there is greater scope for regional autonomy in
larger and/or richer districts. Hence, we control for district-level GDP in all our regressions
and, in one additional specification (Table 8), we also interact initial GDP levels with a
post-splitting dummy. In addition, we considered the change in ethnic fractionalization
over the entire period to rule out the possibility that districts with higher expected gains
in terms of increased homogeneity, were accommodated with an earlier splitting. The
timing also appears to be independent on the number of pre-splitting ethnic conflicts.18
Finally we are also concerned with the possibility that ethnic groups having natural
resources, i.e. forests, in their corner would apply for an early splitting. We depict this
possibility in Figure C.3 of the Appendix. The district of type I (Panel I) has the same
ethnic groups, A and B, of the district of type II (Panel II). A and B also represent the
post-splitting homogenous administrative units. The two types of district have the same
level of ethnic fractionalization and the same share of forest area but they differ in how
the forest area is distributed across ethnic groups. In particular, for type I ethnic group
B has the forest in its corner, while for type II the forest is populated by both ethnic
groups. We propose two alternative specifications to rule out the possibility that a district
of type I is likely to split earlier than a district of type II. First, while it is not possible to
directly observe whether certain ethnic groups were in control of forest resources, we can
construct a measure of ethnic fragmentation within the forestry and the agricultural sector,
respectively. The implicit assumption behind this exercise is that ethnic groups that live in
the proximity of the forest and are interested in pushing for an early split to increase logging
activity are expected to be mainly employed in the forestry or agricultural sector. Results
are reported in the last two rows of Table 5 and show no significant correlation between
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Table 5: Test of exogeneity of the timing of splitting based on 2000 borders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Entire sample Split before moratoria Split after moratoria Entire sample
Dep. Var: Years before splitting Years before splitting Years before splitting After moratoria
EF in 2000 -0.650 0.030 0.126 -0.126
(1.051) (0.455) (0.347) (0.179)
Change in EF -0.079 -0.492 -0.211 0.063
(4.419) (1.199) (2.515) (0.717)
Pre-split defor. (log) -0.250 0.087 -0.082 -0.050
(0.219) (0.057) (0.072) (0.032)
Ethnic conflicts -0.440 -0.254 0.400 -0.060
(0.735) (0.253) (0.288) (0.118)
GDP of district in 2000 (log) -0.353 -0.288*** 0.147 -0.043
(0.360) (0.080) (0.131) (0.056)
Population in 2000 (log) -0.320 -0.248 0.134 -0.038
(0.516) (0.150) (0.157) (0.079)
Area (log) -0.413 0.120 -0.027 -0.090*
(0.349) (0.111) (0.203) (0.053)
EF wihtin forestry sector 0.783 -0.172 -0.077 0.166
(1.097) (0.454) (0.436) (0.175)
EF within agricultural sector 0.267 -0.019 0.078 0.047
(1.201) (0.534) (0.441) (0.189)
Districts that split 95 70 25 95
Standard errors clustered at the province level in parenthesis, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Each cell is a different
bivariate OLS regression of the timing of the first split on district characteristics. The unit of observation is the district
based on 2000 borders. For districts that split twice we consider only the first splitting event.
any of these measures and the time of splitting. Second, we consider districts as defined
by 2010 borders (A and B units in Figure C.3), and interact ethnic fragmentation within
2010 borders with the share of forest in the district. The intent of this estimation exercise
is to capture whether the ethnic homogeneity of the population living in a forest-rich area
(corresponding to the new formed district), was a driver of the time of the splitting of the
original district. Table C.1 of the Appendix shows that the coefficient on the interaction
term is never significant. The same Table also shows no significant coefficient when in
the interaction term we replace the share of forest area with the share of the population
employed in the forestry sector in 2010.
In Figure 3, we provide a visual assessment of the impact of changes in ethnic fractional-
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ization on deforestation over time. The plot is based on a specification where deforestation
is regressed on a set of leads and lags of a dummy variable that is equal to one for all
post-splitting years, interacted with the change in ethnic fractionalization experienced af-
ter the splitting. Figure 3 plots the coefficients of the interaction terms. It shows no
statistically significant difference in deforestation patterns during the pre-splitting period.
It also shows that, after the split, a change in ethnic fractionalization altered the pattern of
deforestation. In particular, greater homogeneity post-splitting is associated to a decrease
in deforestation.19
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Years before and after splitting
The plot is created by estimating the following equation: fit =
∑2
j=−3 βj(posti,t+j × changeEFi) + dt +
ui + εit, where post is a dummy variable taking value 1 for all years after the splitting. We take leads
and lags of this dummy variable and interact them with the change in ethnic fractionalization observed at
the time of the splitting. Note that the entire period of analysis is divided into three periods before the
splitting and two periods after the splitting, where the second period captures all the years from the second
after the splitting onwards. The graph plots the βjs and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 6: Ethnic Fractionalization and deforestation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EF 1.181** 1.428**
(0.484) (0.532)
EF (sum of L0 - L1) 1.711***
(0.529)
EF (sum of L0 - L2) 2.379***
(0.732)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4044 3937 3937 3611
Districts that split 95 95 95 95
Total Number of Districts 337 331 331 331
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the log of square
meters deforested. Each observation is a district based on 2000 dis-
trict boundaries. Controls include a binary variable indicating the
year of splitting, district-level GDP, population, government expen-
diture and expenditure on infrastructure. The coefficient of “EF (sum
of L0 - L1)” is given by the cumulative sum of the contemporaneous
and lagged effect. “EF (sum of L0 - L2)” includes also the second lag
of EF.
V MAIN RESULTS
Table 6 reports the results from estimating the baseline model (equation (8)). In the first
column the positive coefficient on EF measures the effect of an increase in ethnic fraction-
alization on deforestation. Since changes in average EF (within pre-splitting borders) were
always negative, we can conclude that the reduction in ethnic heterogeneity due to splitting
has induced a reduction in deforestation. The effect is large. A decrease in average EF
corresponding to the average change observed in the sample (-0.05) leads to a 6% decrease
in deforestation. In column 2 we include government expenditure, district-level GDP and
expenditure on infrastructures, such as local roads and water systems, that are important
drivers of deforestation. In Table C.3 of the Appendix we show that results persist when
including district time trends.
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In columns 3 and 4 we show the results of a distributed lagged model with one and two
lags respectively. Coefficients show the sum of the immediate effect and the lagged effects
of EF. The effect is larger in the longer run as one would expect. Column 3 indicates that
one year after splitting the average change in EF (-0.05) would induce a decrease of 9% in
deforestation. Two years after the splitting the cumulative impact reaches 12%.20
In Table 7 we estimate our main specification separately by land-use zones. Column 1
and 2 show the results for production and conversion zones, while column 3 and 4 present
the results for the conservation and protection zones. The former are the zones where, up
to a point, logging is legal even though “illegal” permits above the quota can be reasonably
easily issued and the distinction between legal and illegal is not quite black and white.
The latter are those forest areas where logging is illegal and therefore, concessions more
difficult to be issued. As expected the effects of EF are significant only in production
and conversion zones. We also find a smaller effect in “other” areas, which are those not
classified under the main four categories. Overall the empirical results presented in this
section support the main prediction of the model of a positive effect of ethnic diversity on
deforestation.
V.I ROBUSTNESS
First, we are concern with the potential correlation between EF and other initial charac-
teristics of the districts. Hence, we interact a dummy for the post-splitting period with a
set of initial characteristics, such as population, district-level GDP, forest area in 2000 and
the share of the population employed in the forestry sector. Column 1 and column 2 of
Table 8 report the results. The effect of ethnic diversity on deforestation remains positive
and statistically significant. The average reduction in EF induces a decrease of 4.7% in
deforestation when all the interaction terms are included in the regression.
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Table 7: Results by forest zones
Production & Conversion Conservation & Protection Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EF 2.876** 1.237 1.268*
(1.200) (1.207) (0.684)
EF (sum L0 - L1) 3.579*** 2.035 1.568**
(1.382) (1.348) (0.684)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3937 3937 3937 3937 3937 3937
Districts 331 331 331 331 331 331
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
The dependent variable is the log of square meters deforested. Each observation is a district-
by-forest zone based on 2000 district boundaries. Controls include a binary variable indicating
the year of splitting, district-level GDP, population, government expenditure and expenditure on
infrastructure. The Production and Conversion zones are those in which legal logging can take
place, while the Conservation and Protection zones are those in which all logging is illegal. Other
forest zones refer to forest areas that do not belong to any of the other four categories. The
coefficient of “EF (sum of L0 - L1)” is given by the cumulative sum of the contemporaneous and
lagged effect.
Second, our results might be driven by geographical factors or other unobservable char-
acteristics that are correlated with logging activity and work at the level of the areas
equivalent to post-splitting administrative units. In the baseline regression we consider
total deforestation within the 2000 administrative borders. The advantage of our data on
forest cover is that they are available at the pixel level and are characterized by an extraor-
dinary high resolution (30 by 30 meters pixels). Hence we can aggregate the deforestation
data at the level of post-splitting administrative borders, even though before splitting they
had no autonomous jurisdiction to decide on logging permits. In this way it is possible to
reconstruct the level of deforestation within new administrative units also for the period
preceding the splitting, i.e. before their creation. One advantage of this specification is
that we can estimate the baseline regression using narrower fixed effects, in particular,
district fixed effects based on 2010 administrative borders, which are smaller than the 2000
district borders (See Figure 1). Column 3 in Table 8 illustrates the regression outcomes
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Table 8: Robustness: additional specifications
Initial characteristics Initial characteristics 2010 boundaries EF Simple average
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EF 1.057** 0.927* 0.536** 1.176**
(0.486) (0.511) (0.233) (0.452)
Post # Forest area in 2000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Post # Population in 2000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Post # GDP in 2000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Post # Share employment 0.041**
forestry in 2000 (0.019)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province by year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3933 3933 5301 3937
Number of Districts 330 330 469 331
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The dependent
variable is the log of square meters deforested. Each observation is a district based on 2000 district boundaries.
Controls include a binary variable indicating the year of splitting, district-level GDP, population, government
expenditure and expenditure on infrastructure. Post is a dummy variable taking value 1 for all years after the
splitting and it is interacted with the initial characteristics of the district: Forest area, Population, GDP and the
share of the population employed in the forestry sector.
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where the dependent variable is the level of deforestation within post-splitting adminis-
trative borders while as before EF is computed at the level of pre-splitting borders. The
coefficient is significant and with the expected sign, and implies that an average reduction
in EF induced a decrease in deforestation of 2.7% within the areas corresponding to the
post-splitting administrative borders.
Third, thus far we have considered an index of ethnic fractionalization after splitting
computed as a weighted average of the indexes of ethnic fractionalization of the post-
splitting districts, where the weights correspond to their population shares. However,
among the most populous districts there could be districts with small forest cover, so it
could be misleading to assign those areas a higher weight. Column 4 of Table 8 proves
that the effect of ethnic fractionalization on deforestation remains positive and signifi-
cant when we assign equal weights to all post-splitting districts to compute the index of
fractionalization.
Fourth, we test whether our results are driven by a particular island in Indonesia. Table
9 shows the results when we perform the Jackknife method and estimate the baseline
regression excluding one island at a time. The coefficient of EF remains positive and
significant in each column.
Fifth, migration of ethnic groups in the wake of district splitting could bias our results if
it is correlated with trends in logging. Two types of migration could happen in the period of
analysis: migration across 2000 district borders and migration across post-splitting districts
but within 2000 administrative borders. We refer to the former as “external” migration
and to the latter as “internal” migration. External migration is taken care of by the way we
compute the index of fractionalization. Since we use the 2010 Census to construct both the
pre-splitting and the post-splitting average index of fractionalization, we are abstracting
from changes in ethnic diversity due to external migration and we only capture changes
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Table 9: Robustness: Excluding one Island at a Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Excluding: Sumatra Java Nusa Tenggara Kalimantan Sulawesi Maluku Papua
EF 1.374** 1.298*** 1.327** 1.486*** 1.280* 1.719*** 1.457**
(0.048) (0.012) (0.041) (0.022) (0.070) (0.009) (0.054)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province by year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2831 2689 3579 3482 3407 3841 3793
Districts 237 227 301 293 286 323 319
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The
dependent variable is the log of square meters deforested in the district. Each observation is a district based
on 2000 district boundaries. Controls include a binary variable indicating the year of splitting, district-level
GDP, population, government expenditure and expenditure on infrastructure.
due to administrative splitting. Internal migration is more problematic since we cannot
track population movements within district boundaries. This could bias our results due to
reverse causality, since changes in deforestation after splitting could induce movements of
ethnic groups across new districts within pre-splitting administrative borders. For instance,
if after splitting a new district head allowed for more deforestation to raise revenues, this
might have led some ethnic groups to leave causing a change in the index of fractionalization
both in the origin and in destination district. In turn, this would have an impact on our
index of ethnic fractionalization in the post-splitting period. The direction of the bias is
unclear but it is unlikely to be large. Indeed, the process of political fragmentation was
driven by the willingness of ethnic groups to live in districts that were better reflecting
their own identity, and individual and social preferences. Therefore, it is implausible that
they moved to another district after such a political process of self-determination. Also
it is unlikely to observe a sizable change in ethnic fractionalization due to deforestation-
induced migration in such a short time period. In addition we construct a measure of
internal migration using the 2010 population census. We are able to measure the share of
population that was living in another district (as defined by 2010 boundaries) in the five
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years preceding the census, which we aggregate within the 2000 boundaries, as the unit
of observation in our regressions. This measure of internal migration shows a very low
correlation with both the change in ethnic fractionalization (7%) and total deforestation
over the period 2005-2010 (16%).
Finally, in Table C.5 of the Appendix we present regressions at the level of village
administrative boundaries. This allows us to control for village-level fixed effects and so
to deal, at a very low scale, with geographic and administrative differences that might be
relevant for deforestation patterns. For example, village heads could have some influence,
although limited, on how the local forest is managed, for example through community-
owned logging companies. The effect of ethnic fractionalization remains significant and
comparable in size to previous specifications.
VI ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION AND COMPE-
TITION
In this section we compare our results to those in Burgess et al. (2012). They show
that greater political fragmentation increases deforestation due to increased competition
among districts. A splitting of districts can have a direct and an indirect effect, where the
former refers to the effect of splitting on the unit that splits, while the latter indicates the
spillover on the rest of the provinces. The increase in competition due to the creation of new
districts influences the provincial wood market and, in turn, the logging activity in all the
administrative units within a given province. The increase in homogeneity due to splitting
instead is expected to mainly affect the district that splits. In addition in our analysis it
is not the number of districts which split that matter, but whether and by how much they
are more homogenous. First, it is not clear in which direction potential spillover effects
of ethnic homogeneity would work and second, they are likely to depend non-trivially on
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geographical proximity (to the unit that splits). Overall, we expect spillover effects to be
small and difficult to quantify. For these two reasons, we only account for the direct effects
of ethnic fractionalization on districts that split. In order to provide a comparison between
the competition and homogeneity effects, we estimate the same specification presented by
Burgess et al. (2012) (Table A8 of their Appendix). We run a regression at the district-level
(using the 2000 pre-splitting boundaries) of deforestation on ethnic diversity, the number
of district splits within the original district borders, as of 2000, and the number of district
splits elsewhere in the province. The “number of districts within original district borders”
captures the direct effect of an increase in competition while the “number of district splits
elsewhere in the province” represents the indirect effect of an increase in competition. Our
findings confirm that the two effects, competition and ethnic fractionalization, work in
opposite directions. In line with Burgess et al. (2012), we find no evidence of a direct effect
of an increase in competition due to splitting, while indirect effects of increased competition
are positive.21 The direct effect of a reduction in ethnic heterogeneity is always positive,
leading to a decrease in deforestation.
We consider the sample of districts that split which allows us to quantify the direct
effect of a change in ethnic fractionalization. Based on our estimates in Table 10, simple
calculations indicate that the average gains from splitting in terms of lower heterogeneity
are offset due to competitive effects, if two or more other splits occur within the same
province. When, however, we consider the largest observed decrease in ethnic fractional-
ization, the positive effects of increased homogeneity are offset if other nine new districts
are created in the province. Therefore, considering only districts that split, the benefits of
homogeneity outweigh the costs of increased competition in 45% of the observed splitting
events. On the other hand, when we analyze the overall impact of political fragmentation
at the province level and we take into account the indirect effects of competition on dis-
tricts that did not split, the positive effects of increased homogeneity are always offset by
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the negative effects of competition. Whether this result would still hold once the spillovers
of ethnic homogeneity are taken into account, remains an open question that goes beyond
the scope of this paper.22




Number of districts within initial -0.002
2000 boundaries (0.063)
Number of district elsewhere 0.039**
in the province (0.018)
EF (sum L0 - L1) 0.816
(1.320)
Number district within initial -0.024
boundaries (sum L0 - L1) (0.114)
Number of district elsewhere 0.052*
in the province (sum L0 - L1) (0.027)
EF (sum L0 - L2) 3.078**
(1.377)
Number district within initial 0.030
boundaries (sum L0 - L2) (0.112)
Number of district elsewhere 0.068**
in the province (sum L0 - L2) (0.028)
District-by-zone FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Island-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17261 15833 14399
Districts by forest zones 1452 1452 1452
Standard errors are clustered at the province level in parenthe-
ses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. An observation is a
district-by-forest zone cell (at the 2000 borders) in a year. The
dependent variable is the log of square meters deforested.
VII CONTROL OF POLITICIANS
The main prediction of our simple model is that deforestation increases with the level of
ethnic fragmentation of the districts. In Section V we have shown that this is indeed the
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case. We now turn to the mechanism underlying our model, namely the effect of ethnic
diversity on the control of politicians. According to our model, in ethnically diverse districts
incumbent politicians face a lower probability to be punished, legally or electorally, for
their misbehavior. As a consequence, heads of ethnically diverse districts are more likely
to issue logging permits that exceed the legal quota in exchange of bribes from logging
companies. In this Section, we study the probability of incumbent politicians to be re-
elected and consider exceptionally high levels of deforestation as a signal of politicians’
misbehavior. In the first part we show how incumbents are re-elected when allowing
more permits before elections and, in the second one, how incumbents use this advantage
strategically, but again, only in ethnically fragmented districts since this is where they
face a lower probability of punishment for their misconduct. By doing this we reveal the
existence of political deforestation cycles (PDF) in more heterogeneous districts. Direct
elections of district heads started in 2005 but the timing of the elections varied from district
to district depending on when the terms of previous Bupati’s were coming to an end.
Some districts had their first direct elections in 2005 while others only in 2010. Skoufias
et al. (2014) show how the timing of direct elections was exclusively due to idiosyncratic
factors. We investigate what happens to incumbent re-election probability as a function of
deforestation.
The estimated equation is the following:
Reelectioni = γf̃i + βf̃i ∗ EF + δEF + pi + ti + εi, (10)
where Reelection indicates the probability of of an incumbent head of district i. f̃ is
our measure of deforestation in the year prior to the election. In particular, we compute the
average level of deforestation over the pre-election period (2001- year of election), excluding
the year prior to the election, and consider the difference between the level of deforestation
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Table 11: Logging and incumbent re-election
Dep. Var.: re-election (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deviation from average pre-elec -0.0000 -0.0005*
(0.0001) (0.0003)
EF 0.2338 0.2261 0.2463
(0.1556) (0.1575) (0.1547)
Deviation from average pre-elec # EF 0.0007*
(0.0004)
Deviation from previous year 0.0000 -0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0004)
Deviation from previous year # EF 0.0006
(0.0005)
Deviation from initial deforestation -0.0000 -0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0003)
Deviation from initial deforestation # EF 0.0006
(0.0004)
Year Election FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Districts 222 222 222 222 222 222
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Each column reports OLS cross-
sectional regressions where the dependent variable takes value one in case of re-election of the incumbent. A
unit of observation is a district, based on post-splitting 2010 borders, where the candidate is an incumbent.
The deviation from average deforestation in the pre-election period captures exceptionally high levels of
deforestation in the year prior to the elections. We also compute alternative measures. In columns 3 and
4 we measure the difference between pre-election deforestation and deforestation in the previous year. In
columns 5 and 6 we use the difference between pre-election deforestation and deforestation in 2001.
in the year before the election and average deforestation.23 We then interact this measure
with the level of ethnic fractionalization EF at the time of election. As an additional check,
we first repeat this exercise replacing f̃ with the overall change in deforestation activity
between the initial year, 2001, and the year prior to the election. Second, we replace f̃
with the one period change in deforestation activity between two years and one year before
the elections.24 We also include province fixed effects, p, and year of election fixed effects,
t. We expect the probability of re-election of the incumbent to decrease when in the year
before the election the district experiences a higher deviation from average deforestation.
At the same time we expect this effect to be smaller in ethnically heterogeneous districts.
In other words, we expect the coefficient on the interaction term, β, in equation (10), to
be positive. Results in Table 11 are consistent with this argument.
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The first column shows that on average a higher level of pre-election deforestation has
no effect on the probability of re-election. However, when we interact pre-election devi-
ations in deforestation with the level of ethnic diversity (column 2) we find that in more
homogenous districts an exceptionally high level of deforestation in the year before elec-
tion decreases the probability of re-election, while the opposite holds in more heterogeneous
districts. This evidence is consistent with the mechanism of a lower control of politicians
in heterogeneous districts, as described in our model. Identification is derived from a
cross-section of incumbents running for re-election and in our sample, given the relative
short time period, we do not observe incumbents more than once. The specification might
imply also a mechanism based upon self-selection. Voters might be more able to discour-
age politicians’ misbehavior in ethnically homogeneous districts, either because politicians
discipline themselves or because politicians with a lower propensity to misbehave enter
politics anticipating voters behavior.




Electionij + dt + ui + εit, (11)
where j indexes leads and lags of the Election variable, which is a dummy that indicates
the year in which the election of the district head takes place. The results are reported
in Table 12. Column 1 confirms the presence of logging cycles showing that deforestation
increases systematically in the proximity of elections. Note that we also find a significant
effect on deforestation in the period immediately after the election. This may be the result
of permits issued immediately before the elections and executed right after it. However
when we split the sample in high and low heterogeneous districts (defined as above or below
the median ethnic fractionalization) we find that this effect is only present in districts with
a high level of ethnic diversity, a result consistent with our hypothesis. This evidence is
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Table 12: Logging and elections
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample EF>median EF<median
Lead 2 0.0950 0.2733* -0.0805
(0.397) (0.050) (0.640)
Lead 1 0.2270** 0.3755*** 0.0740
(0.029) (0.002) (0.641)
Election year 0.1229 0.2375* 0.0072
(0.210) (0.057) (0.961)
Lag 1 0.3085** 0.4479*** 0.1992
(0.010) (0.004) (0.240)
Lag 2 0.1584 0.2350 0.0719
(0.338) (0.198) (0.778)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2465 1225 1240
Districts 310 154 156
EF (mean) 0.56 0.79 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.1, **p <
0.05, ***p < 0.01. A unit of observation is a district
based on post-splitting 2010 borders. The dependent
variable is the log of square meters deforested in the dis-
trict. A statistical test shows that the coefficients of the
first lag and the first lead are statistically different be-
tween districts with a level of ethnic diversity below and
above the median.
35
also coherent with results in Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), who find that political
budget cycles occur mostly where the freedom of the press and control of politicians are
lower.
VIII CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the relationship between ethnic diversity and deforestation in Indone-
sia. We can use the exogenous timing of the splitting of jurisdictions and document a
causal relationship between ethnic fractionalization and deforestation. We find that more
ethnically fractionalized areas display more deforestation after controlling for a variety of
possible confounding factors, including geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Since
districts splitting allowed by the decentralization process increases homogenization in the
districts which split, we uncover an effect of decentralization that lowers deforestation and
goes in the opposite direction of the one pointed out by Burgess et al. (2012). Our findings
highlight a trade-off between reduced ethnic heterogeneity and increased competition in
the natural resource market when deciding the optimal level of decentralization of natural
resource management.
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL CHANNELS
A FIRST CHANNEL: ABILITY TO FIGHT
In this section we describe two additional channels that may link ethnic fractionalization
and deforestation. The first is the ability of local communities to fight against logging
companies. The second channel is that because of less cooperation in more diverse com-
munities, in case of no conflict with the logging company they receive a lower compensation
from the latter making logging cheaper. We retain all the main assumptions of the model
in Section II and we add a stage in which the logging company starts a negotiation with
the local community. In particular the company offers a compensation for using the forest.
We allow for the possibility of conflict between the company and the community in case
the negotiation fails. The timing is the following: in t0 the politician decides the amount of
logging concessions, f , to give to the company in exchange for a bribe, in t1 the company
decides how much to pay (in terms of bribes) to obtain the concessions. In t2 the bargain-
ing takes place and the company offers a compensation payment to the community. If the
community refuses it, the negotiation fails and the community tries to block the logging
activity. With probability q the community wins the conflict and stops the logging. In this
case the logging company loses the bribe, b, it already paid, while the community controls
the forest and enjoys a utility, U(F ), which is an increasing and concave function of the size
of the standing forest, F , with F ∈ [0, F̄ ]. With probability (1− q) the company wins the
conflict and continues to log without paying any compensation to the community. In the
next section we will assume that the probability that the community wins the conflict, q,
depends negatively on its level of ethnic fragmentation. The model is solved backward and
has two different equilibria, one where negotiation succeeds (under negotiation) and one
where negotiation fails (under conflict).25 For each equilibrium we derive the optimal level
of deforestation and how this level is influenced by changes in ethnic diversity. First we
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characterize the equilibrium under negotiation and then we turn to the one under conflict.
We begin describing the problem faced by the company and we analyze the outcome of the
negotiation between the company and the community. Then we determine the bribe that
the company is willing to pay and finally we study the decision of the local government
and define the equilibrium.
Negotiation stage
In the last stage the company decides whether to start a conflict with the community
comparing the payoffs under the two different scenarios. In case of conflict the expected
payoff for the company is:
πLC = −bfq(EF ) + (1− q(EF ))f(p− c− b) (A-12)
where the superscript L stays for “logging company” and the subscript C indicates “conflict”.
EF stands for ethnic fractionalization, which, in the empirical section, will be measured
by a commonly used Herfindhal index. We assume that qEF (EF ) < 0 , namely more
ethnically fractionalized communities are less likely to prevail against logging companies.
f is the amount of wood extracted by the company, p is the price that is determined at
the province level and we consider as exogenous, c is the marginal cost of extraction and b
is the bribe per unit of wood to be paid to the local politician. Let F̄ be the total size of
the forest, then the expected payoff of the community is:
πCC = q(EF )U(F̄ ) + (1− q(EF ))U(F̄ − f) (A-13)
where the superscript C stays for “community” and (F̄ −f) represents the size of the forest
left to the community after deforestation. To avoid the conflict the company needs to
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compensate the local community and solves the following problem:
Max
f
πLNC(f) ≡ pf(1− α)− cf − bf (A-14)
s.t. πLNC(f) = 0 and U(F̄ − f) + αpf ≥ πCC (A-15)
where the subscript NC indicates “no conflict”. The profit of the logging company is
reduced by α which is the share of the revenues from logging paid to the community as
a compensation benefit. Given the free entry assumption, the company maximizes its
profit under the zero profit condition. The share of the logging revenues given to the
community needs to be at least equal to its reservation utility, which corresponds to the
expected revenues that the community can extract from the forest if the arrangement with
the company is not agreed, namely πCC . Notice that the compensation payment is lower
when the community is ethnically heterogeneous. This result is supported by the empirical
evidence found by Engel and Palmer (2006) who, looking specifically at Indonesia, show
that the compensation benefits paid by the companies are increasing in the degree of
ethnic homogeneity of the community. Substituting the expression for πCC in the zero
profit condition, we can derive the maximum bribe the company is willing to pay, as:
b = p − c − q(EF )[U(F̄ )−U(F̄−f)]
f
. Turning to the first stage of the problem, we need to
determine the equilibrium bribe and the
number of logging permits the politician will supply in equilibrium. Recall that the




As before the local politician decides how many permits to sell to the companies, facing a
probability of detection φ(f − f̄), which now depends only on the difference between the
number of illegal permits issued and the legal quota, f̄ , set for the district. In case the
head of the district is caught she loses all the future rents from holding office, r, or more
generally she faces a penalty. The local politician solves:
Max
f
V ≡ bf − φ(f − f̄)r (A-16)
which substituting with the expression for b, becomes:
Max
f
V ≡ f(p− c)− q(EF )[U(F̄ )− U(F̄ − f)]− φ(f − f̄)r (A-17)
Hence the first order condition is:
p− c− q(EF ))UF (F̄ − f) = φf (f − f̄)r (A-18)
From equation (A-3) we can easily derive the effect of an increase in the degree of ethnic
diversity on the number of logging permits supplied in equilibrium, as:
fEF (EF ) = −
−qEF (EF )UF (F̄ − f)
q(EF )UFF (F̄ − f)− φff (f − f̄)r
(A-19)
Given the denominator is negative26 and recalling that q() is a decreasing function of ethnic
fractionalization, proposition 1 follows.
Proposition 1 When ruling ethnically diverse communities, which are less able to
organize and win a fight against the logging companies, the politician releases a larger
number of illegal logging permits increasing the equilibrium level of deforestation. Formally,
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in equilibrium fEF (EF ) > 0.
In this section we have shown that when the company goes for the agreement, the
compensation payment to a fragmented community is lower, while the politician faces the
prospect of a higher bribe. As a consequence the politician raises the number of logging
permits and the equilibrium level of deforestation increases.
Equilibrium under conflict
If the company decides to go for conflict she sets πLC = 0 to determine its willingness to pay
for a permit. In particular the optimal bribe in case of conflict is: b = (1− q(EF ))(p− c).
The local politician solves the same problem as above, which substituting with the new
expression for b, becomes:
Max
f
V ≡ f(1− q(EF ))(p− c)− φ(f − f̄)r (A-20)
Hence the first order condition is:
(1− q(EF ))(p− c) = φf (f − f̄)r (A-21)
The effect of an increase in the degree of ethnic diversity on the number of logging
permits supplied in equilibrium can be derived as before:
fEF (EF ) = −
qEF (EF )(p− c)
φff (f − f̄)r
(A-22)
Given the denominator is negative and recalling that q() is a decreasing function of ethnic
fractionalization, we show that ethnic fractionalization increases deforestation also in the
case of a conflict between the company
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and the community. In fact when the company goes for the conflict, the bribe paid to the
politician increases with the chance of winning the conflict by the company. The latter in
turn is higher if the company fights against an ethnically fragmented community. Expecting
a higher bribe the politician raises the number of logging permits and the equilibrium level
of deforestation increases. raises the number of logging permits and the equilibrium level
of deforestation increases.
A SECOND CHANNEL: NEGOTIATION POWER
Ethnic diversity can also influence the compensation payment obtained by a community in
a direct way. In particular, there can be situations in which conflict is not an option, for
example because the logging company faces high reputation costs. However, even during
a peaceful negotiation a community which is ethnically diverse, can extract a lower share
of the logging company’s revenues as a compensation benefit. The reason is that Ethnic
diversity can also influence the compensation payment obtained by a community in a direct
way. In particular, there can be situations in which conflict is not an option, for example
because the logging company faces high reputation costs. However, even during a peaceful
negotiation a community which is ethnically diverse, can extract a lower share of the
logging company’s revenues as a compensation benefit. The reason is that fractionalized
communities, being less cooperative and experiencing more disagreement in the decision
making process are able to exert a lower bargaining power. To illustrate this point we
can simply assume the share, α, of the logging revenues that go to the community, being
a decreasing function of ethnic fractionalization, i.e. α(EF ), with αEF (EF ) < 0. The
problem is solved as before and it is easy to show that the equilibrium bribe, namely
the maximum price the company is willing to pay for a permit, is: b = p(1− α(EF ))− c.
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Substituting it in the politician’s objective function, we can derive the first order condition:
p(1− α(EF ))− c = φf (f − f̄)r (A-23)
In this case the effect of an increase in ethnic diversity on the equilibrium number of
logging permits is:
fEF (EF ) = −
αEF (EF )p
φff (f − f̄)r
(A-24)
Recalling that the share α(EF ) is decreasing in EF , the second proposition follows:
Proposition 2 More ethnically diverse communities, being able to obtain a lower share
of the logging revenues, render logging cheaper for the company. As a consequence the politi-
cian, with the prospect of a higher bribe, releases a larger number of illegal logging permits
increasing the equilibrium level of deforestation. Formally, in equilibrium fEF (EF ) > 0.
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APPENDIX B: DATA
The forest cover data come from a satellite generated forest cover database by Hansen
et al. (2013), with pixels defined at a resolution of 1 arc-second, which is approximately
30mx30m squares near the equator, though the exact size depends on where a pixel is
located on the globe. We used a dynamic conversion to take the change into account and
areas in our database are reported in square meters. There are three data files that are
relevant for our analysis and we use: treecover2000, loss, and lossyear. Treecover2000, based
on matching the spectral signatures reflected off the surface of the earth to the spectral
signatures of different land surface types, measures which pixels were covered in forest in
the year 2000, which is taken as the base year of the data. The data in this raster (a
geo-referenced grid that holds numbers) are integers that range from 0 to 100 that denote
the percent forest cover of a particular pixel (defined as canopy closure for vegetation above
5m in height). Loss is binary in nature, and simply records whether or not the relevant
change in forest cover occurred for a given pixel between 2000 and 2013. Lossyear is a
fourth geo-referenced raster, but pixels can take on values from 0-13, with 0 recording no
loss observed, and 1-13 record which year the loss occurred, essentially disaggregating the
loss variable temporally. We have reconstructed the continuous loss information, using a
combination of treecover2000 and lossyear. The smallest forest loss that we measure is
900 square meters, which corresponds to 1 pixel of reported loss. Notice that treecover2000
records percent forest cover for each pixel in the base year 2000, but subsequent losses are
binary (pixels are either recorded as deforested or not). In order to measure forest cover
in the subsequent years we have considered the percentage forest cover times the area: for
instance, if a 900 sq. meters grid cell was recorded to have 50% of the area forested, it
would count as 450 sq. meters of forest.
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure C.1: Ethnic Diversity across Indonesian Districts (2006).







































The plot is created estimating the following equation: fit =
∑2
j=−3 βj(posti,t+j) + dt + ui + εit, where
post is a dummy variable taking value 1 for all years after the splitting. The graph plots the βjs for the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.3: Forest cover distribution across post-splitting administrative units and timing
of splitting.
(a) Type I (b) Type II
The district represented here is Ogan Komering Ulu. The areas A and B are an example of post-splitting
administrative units. The shaded green area indicates the forest cover. The location of forest cover and
the location of the internal border between A and B in the Figure, are hypothetical and for an explicative
purpose only.
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Table C.2: Robustness: district time-trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EF 0.999 0.904 2.895
(0.300) (0.506) (0.148)




EF (sum L0 - L1) 2.463*
(0.072)
EF (sum L0 - L2) 5.657**
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District time-trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4044 3707 3707 3370 3370
Number of districts 337 337 337 337 337
Standard errors are clustered at the district level (in parenthesis), *p <
0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The unit of observation is the district
based on 2000 borders. The dependent variable is the log of square
meters deforested in the district.
Table C.3: Robustness: district time-trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EF 1.007 0.700 1.509
(0.961) (0.1.182) (1.297)




EF (sum L0 - L1) 1.193
(1.028)
EF (sum L0 - L2) 4.328***
(1.601)
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-by-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District time-trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4044 4044 4044 3370 3370
Number of districts 337 337 337 337 337
Standard errors are clustered at the district level (in parenthesis), *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The unit of observation is the district based on
2000 borders. The dependent variable is the log of square meters deforested
in the district.
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Table C.4: Ethnic Fractionalization and deforestation before and after the first moratorium
(1) (2)
Split before 2004 moratorium Split after 2004 moratorium
EF 1.678** 4.026**
(0.707) (1.736)
Year FE Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes
Observations 3645 3124
Districts 306 262
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, *p < 0.1,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the log of square
meters deforested. Controls include a binary variable indicating the year of
splitting, district-level GDP, population, government expenditure and ex-
penditure on infrastructure.
Table C.5: Robustness: Village level regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EF 1.061* 1.094*
(0.586) (0.596)
EF (sum L0 - L1) 1.130**
(0.567)
EF (sum L0 - L2) 1.337**
(0.658)
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province by year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 919224 919224 833536 758094
Number of villages 76602 76602 76225 76225
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses,
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The unit of observa-
tion is a village as defined by 2010 administrative borders.
The dependent variable is the log of square meters defor-
ested in a village. Controls include a binary variable indi-
cating the year of splitting, district-level GDP, population,
government expenditure and expenditure on infrastructure.




1On the positive role of social capital in the development of localities and their ability to provide public
goods, see Banfield (1958), Putnam et al. (1993), Guiso et al. (2013). For a survey of the literature
on the effect of ethnic fractionalization on (among other things) public goods provision see Alesina and
La Ferrara (2005). In addition forests are common (public) goods for local communities and may be
subject to exploitation by logging companies. Low social capital interferes with the communities’ capacity
to organize and lowers their ability to extract compensations from the logging companies making it cheaper
for the latter to increase deforestation.
2This is consistent with work on the size of political jurisdictions by Alesina and Spolaore (2005). They
argue that communities split to create more homogenous places even at the cost of giving up economies
of scale.
3Morjaria (2016) examines the effect of democratization on deforestation in Kenya. The paper suggests
that deforestation might be used for patronage politics, especially in loyal districts, defined as those whose
major group in the population has the same ethnicity as the political leader. Morjaria (2016) uses the cross
sectional variation in ethnic diversity to define loyal, swing and opposition groups. More recently, Burgess
et al. (2016) adopt a regression discontinuity approach to show the causal effect of Brazilian national forest
policies on deforestation.
4According to Bappenas (2007), at the end of the ban period in 2006, around a hundred of requests at
different steps of the approval process were kept on hold for evaluation.
5At its peak in 2000, some 75% of logging activity was illegal, falling to 40% by 2006, according to an
estimate by the British think-tank Chatham House (Hoare and Wellesley, 2014). The NGO Environmental
Investigation Agency, alleged in 2005 that $600 millions worth of Indonesian timber was being smuggled
to China each month, with both the army and the police taking an active role. A more recent report
by Transparency International Indonesia (2011) on the existing corruption risks in the forestry sector in
three Indonesian provinces (Riau, Aceh and Papua) has identified bribery to obtain licenses and logging
concessions as a major source of corruption. In Pelawan district the head of the district was arrested in
2008 for issuing illegal licenses to 15 logging companies.
6Kasmita Widodo, the national coordinator of the Participatory Mapping Network (JPKK), an organi-
zation that supports efforts to map indigenous people, estimates that as much as 70% of forest area in In-
donesia is covered by these overlapping permits. Link: http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/indigenous-
peoples-vow-to-map-customary-forests/
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7In Appendix A we describe two additional channels which may link ethnic fractionalization and de-
forestation. The first is the ability of local communities to fight against logging companies. For instance,
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have established that ethnically diverse communities can coordinate less, hence
are less effective in organizing a political battle. The second channel is that more diverse communities,
which are less able to negotiate because of coordination issues, receive a lower compensation from log-
ging companies. As a result, deforestation is higher in more ethnically fragmented communities, since it
becomes relatively cheaper for logging companies.
8This is a broadly used measure of ethnic fractionalization which is the probability that two individuals
randomly drawn from the population belong to two different ethnic groups.
9Of the 341 original districts, we excluded 9 districts for which we could not get data on deforestation
and 4 districts that could not be matched across data sources.
10Of the 341 original districts, 4 districts could not be matched across data sources.
11In theory, child and parent districts could experience differences in institutional capacity after splitting,
e.g. enforcement and access to financial resources. In the context of deforestation Burgess et al. (2012)
show that there is no temporary decline in enforcement by comparing the parent and the child district
after splitting. On the other hand, Bazzi et al. (2015) find that ethnic fractionalization matters relatively
less for conflict and crime in child districts and relatively more in parent districts.
12Mapping 2000 census data to final 2010 district boundaries was not possible because data on ethnicity
are not available at a lower administrative level than the district.
13In fact, according to Ananta et al. (2013), ethnicity classification changed between the two census for
many of the 15 largest groups and there is reported under-estimation of some ethnic groups (Acehnese,
Dayak and Chinese in particular) in 2000 mainly because of political and security issues. Therefore the
two sources are strictly speaking not compatible.
14The name GDP is normally used in this literature (see Burgess et al. (2012)). It is a measure of gross
regional domestic product that includes gas and oil revenues. McCulloch and Malesky (2011) point out
that although all districts are supposed to follow the same procedures in computing their GDP, there is
variation in the capacity of local statistical offices across the country. Moreover, some components of GDP
such as agricultural or manufacturing output are much better measured than others, due to the accuracy
of their underlying sources. Nevertheless, sub-national level data are cleaned and standardized by the
World Bank upon release into the INDO-DAPOER dataset.
15The program aimed at relocating landless people from highly populated areas, mainly Java, to less
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density populated areas. Javanese is the most widespread ethnic group in Indonesia.
16See also Burgess et al. (2012), Bazzi et al. (2015), and Padro et al. (2013).
17The fact that the timing is independent of the level of ethnic fractionalization does not contradict the
fact that more diverse places were more likely to split.
18These data were obtained from UNSFIR and cover only 14 out of 28 provinces for the period 1990-
2003. The variable refers to the number of conflicts, classified by a team of expert as ethnically motivated,
that occurred in a given district from 1990 to the year of splitting up to 2003.
19In Figure C.2 of the Appendix, we also show that no differences in deforestation trends can be detected
between original districts that split and those that did not split.
20In Table C.4 of the Appendix we show that the results persist also when we consider separately the
pre- and post-moratorium periods. Arguably, one might expect that, in the second period, districts could
potentially anticipate a second moratorium and hence push to anticipate or accelerate the redistricting
process under the pressure of certain ethnic groups. When considering the first period, potentially the
most exogenous, we find very similar results.
21The lack of immediate direct effects might be attributable to initial disruptions in logging activities
as institutions get organized in the newly created political jurisdictions.
22Back of the envelope calculations give an indication of the overall magnitude of the effect of ethnic
homogeneity on deforestation. When we consider its short run effect, we find that the reduction in ethnic
diversity due to splitting accounts for 1.76 percent of the total deforestation that we observe in our sample
over the entire period. This effect corresponds to a reduction in deforestation of about 283,000 hectares.
23The measure can be formalized as follow: f̃Pi = fit−1 − 1/(t− 2)
∑t−2
j=0 fij for the pre-election period,
where t is the year elections take place.
24Our results do not change when we include a control for oil and gas revenues received by the district
in the year of the election.
25Given the free entry assumption the company is always indifferent between negotiation and conflict.
Hence it is not possible to pin down a unique equilibrium where the agreement is the option preferred by
the company. The understanding of the emergence of conflict vs negotiation goes beyond the scope of this
paper.
26The denominator represents the second order condition of the maximization problem thus it has to be
negative at the optimum. This is the case given the concavity of U().
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